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6.6. ERMUSR 01-11-2005
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6.6. ERMUSR 01-11-2005
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ability to obtain transmission service at a known and reasonable rate <br />over a long time horizon (often measured in decades, not. years). <br />The LIVID/FTR s}'stem has deprived thorn of their ability to plan with <br />any certainty for new long-term generation resources that <br />APPA members are deeply would require transmission service, e.g., development, of <br />Concerned abOUt their` or participation in a new generation resource (including <br />Inability t0 hedge fully their erl~ironmentally desirable resources such as wind generation), <br />transmission congestion or execution of long-term power supply contracts with <br />COStS, and thUS. t0 aSSUre suppliers that require the buyer to assume the risk of <br />their ability t0 Obtain transmission service. <br />transmission S@rViceat a ~ Under an L~9P congestion pricing regime, the "all-in" price of <br />known and reasonable rate any new resource is subject to price fluctuations, not only due <br />Over a IOng tlmehOriZOn to increases in Fuel prices, {fixed transmission costs, and other <br />(Often meaSUred In decades, such "traditional" factors, but. due to congestion caused by <br />ItOt years). shifts in transmission system usage and prices in the RTO's <br />spot power markets (which can be extremely volatile). This is <br />true even whew the tetility is not purchasing power in that market. If suppliers <br />agree to assume this additional price risk at all, they do so only in return <br />for hefty premiums that come out of electric consumers' pockets. 'T'his <br />increased uncertainty and risk could lead to lower credit ratings and <br />increased capital costs when public power systems commit to nee-v long- <br />term arrangements and the accompanying financing.' Since many public <br />po~ti•er systems are physically or ~~irtuall}' ~'erticall~° integrated acrd all retain <br />the obligation to serve their loads, they see this as an extremely serious <br />shortcoming in FERC's preferred RTO model. <br />Such ashort-term focused regime is not good for the industr~~ in the long <br />run: not good for utilities that need long-term po~ti~er supplies; not good <br />for generation project. developers that need long-term commitments to <br />support their projects; not good for financial institutions lending the <br />5 A Special Comment by Moody's Investors Service issued in September 2004, <br />en[itled "Credit Issues Kesurface as New Electric Generation Projects by Public <br />Poceer Utilities Take Center Stage," cites several Cactors that could contribute <br />ro increased credit risk for public power utilities building new generation <br />facilities. Prominent among thorn are transmission and pricing practices: <br />"Aloody's believes there is potential risk in the short-term marginal pricing <br />model being used in various regional energti~ markets in the U.S. VVithuut <br />long-term contracts for transmission rights and pricE: certainty for the <br />transmission of energy from new generation facilities, cost recovery in <br />the long term may not be assured." Id. at 4. <br />Restructuring at the Crossroads: FERC Electric Policy Reconsidered 9 <br />
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