4.4. SR 11-13-2001 - Laserfiche WebLink

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113 S. Ct. 1505 (Cite as: 507 U.S. 410, *430, 113 S.Ct. 1505, *'1517) Page 13 conclude that Cincinnati has failed to justify that policy. The regulation is not a permissible regulation of commercial speech, for on this record it is clear that the interests that Cincinnati has asserted are.unrelated to any distinction between "commercial handbills" and "newspapers." Moreover, because the ban is predicated on the content of the publications distributed by the subject newsracks, it is not a valid time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech. '431 For these reasons, Cincinnati's categorical ban on the distribution, via newsrack, of "commercial handbills" cannot be squared with the dictates of the First Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice BLACKMUN, concurring. I agree that Cincinnati's ban on commercial newsracks cannot withstand scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed. 2d 341 (1980), and Board of Trustees of State University of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 106 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1989), and I therefore join the Court's opinion. I write separately because I continue to believe that the analysis set forth in Central Hudson and refined in Fox affords insufficient protection for truthful, noncoercive commercial speech concerning lawful activities. In Central Hudson, I expressed the view that "intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for a restraint on commercial speech designed to protect consumers from misleading or coercive speech, or a regulation related to the time, place, or manner of *'1518 commercial speech," but not for a regulation that suppresses truthful commercial speech to serve some other government purpose. 447 U.S., at 573, 100 S. Ct., at 2355 (opinion concurring in judgment). The present case demonstrates that there is no reason to treat truthful commercial speech as a class that is less "valuable" than noncommercial speech. Respondents' publications, which respectively advertise the availability of residential properties and educational opportunities, are unquestionably "valuable" to those who choose to read them, and Cincinnati's ban on commercial newsracks should be subject to the same scrutiny we would apply to a regulation burdening noncommercial speech. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1976), this Court held that commercial speech "which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction'" is protected by the First Amendment, id., at 762, 96 S. Ct., at 1825, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh *432 Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 93 S. Ct. 2553, 2558, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973). In so holding, the Court focused principally on the First Amendment interests of the listener. The Court noted that "the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate," 425 U.S., at 763, 96 S.Ct., at 1826, and that "the free flow of commercial information is indispensable ... to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system ... [and] to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered," id., at 765, 96 S.Ct., at 1827. See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2699, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1977). The Court recognized, however, that government may regulate commercial speech in ways that it may not regulate protected noncommercial speech. See generally Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S., at 770-772, 96 S. Ct., at 1829-1831. Government may regulate commercial speech to ensure that it is not false, deceptive, or misleading, id., at 771- 772, 96 S.Ct., at 1830-1831, and to ensure that it is not coercive, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 457, 98 S. Ct. 1912, 1919, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978). Government also may prohibit commercial speech proposing unlawful activities. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S., at 388, 93 S. Ct., at 2560. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S., at 384, 97 S.Ct., at 2709. [FN1] To permit government regulation on Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works