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113 S. Ct. 1505 <br />(Cite as: 507 U.S. 410, '421, 113 S.Ct. 1505, *'1512) <br /> <br />Page 8 <br /> <br />900, 904, 84 L.Ed. 1213] (1940). <br />"If there is a kind of commercial speech that <br />lacks all First Amendment protection, <br />therefore it must be distinguished by its <br />content. Yet the speech whose content <br />deprives it of protection cann6t simply be <br />speech on a commercial subject. No one <br />would contend that our pharmacist may be <br />prevented from being heard on the subject of <br />whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices <br />should be regulated, or their advertisement <br />forbidden. Nor can it be dispositive that a <br />commercial advertisement is noneditorial, <br />and merely reports a fact. Purely factual <br />matter of public interest may claim <br />protection. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. [809], <br />at 822 [95 S. Ct. 2222, 2232, 44 L.Ed. 2d 600 <br />(1975) ]; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, <br />102 [60 S. Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093] (1940)." <br />Id., 425 U.S., at 761-762, 96 S. Ct., at 1825. <br /> <br />We then held that even speech that does no <br />more than propose a commercial transaction is <br />protected by the First Amendment. /d., at <br />762, 96 S.Ct., at 1825. [FN17] <br /> <br />FN17. Justice BLACKMUN, writing for the Court <br />in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 <br />S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), summarized the <br />reasons for extending First Amendment protection to <br />"core" commercial speech: <br />"The listener's interest [in commercial speech] is <br />substantial: the consumer's concern for the free flow <br />of commercial speech often may be far keener than <br />his concern for urgent political dialogue. <br />Moreover, significant societal interests are served by <br />such speech. Advertising, though entirely <br />commercial, may often carry information of import <br />to significant issues of the day. See Bigelow v. <br />Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 [95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d <br />600] (1975). And commercial speech serves to <br />inform the public of the availability, nature, and <br />prices of products and services, and thus performs <br />an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in <br />a free enterprise system. See FTC v. Procter & <br />Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603-604 [87 S.Ct. 1224, <br />1243, 18 L.Ed.2d 303] (1967) (Harlan, J., <br />concurring). In short, such speech serves individual <br />and societal interests in assuring informed and <br />reliable decisionmaking." M., 433 U.S., at 364, 97 <br />S.Ct., at 2699. <br />Of course, we were not the first to recognize the <br /> <br />value of commercial speech: <br />"'[Advertisements] are well calculated to enlarge <br />and enlighten the public mind, and are worthy of <br />being enumerated among the many methods of <br />awakening and maintaining the popular attention, <br />with which more modern times, beyond all preceding <br />example, abound.'" D. Boorstin, The Americans: <br />The Colonial Experience 328, 415 (1958), quoting I. <br />Thomas, History of Printing in America with a <br />Biography of Printers, and an Account of <br />Newspapers (2d ed. 1810). <br /> <br />*'1513 *422 In later opinions we have stated <br />that speech proposing a commercial <br />transaction is entitled to lesser protection than <br />other constitutionally guaranteed expression. <br />See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. <br />447, 455-456, 98 S. Ct. 1912, 1918, 56 L.Ed. 2d <br />444 (1978). We have also suggested that such <br />lesser protection was appropriate for a <br />somewhat larger category of commercial <br />speech--"that is, expression related solely to <br />the economic interests of the speaker and its <br />audience." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. <br />v. Public Service Cornm'n of New York, 447 U.S., <br />at 561, 100 S. Ct., at 2348. We did not, <br />however, use that definition in either Bolger v. <br />Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 103 <br />S. Ct. 2875, 77 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1983), or in Board <br />of Trustees of State University of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 <br />U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed. 2d 388 <br />(1989). <br /> <br />In the Bolger case we held that a federal <br />statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited <br />advertisements for contraceptives could not be <br />applied to the appellee's promotional <br />materials. Most of the appellee's mailings <br />consisted primarily of price and quantity <br />information, and thus fell "within the core <br />notion of commercial speech--'speech which <br />does "no more than propose a commercial <br />transaction.' .... Bolger, 463 U.S., at 66, 103 <br />S. Ct., at 2880 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 <br />U.S., at 762, 96 S. Ct., at 1825, in turn quoting <br />Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comrn'n on <br />Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 93 S. Ct. <br />2553, 2558, 37 L. Ed.2d 669 (1973)). Relying <br />in part on the appellee's economic motivation, <br />the Court also answered the "closer question" <br />about the proper *423 label for informational <br />pamphlets that were concededly <br /> <br />Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to <br /> <br />Orig. U.S. Govt. Works <br /> <br /> <br />