113 S. Ct. 1505
<br />(Cite as: 507 U.S. 410, '421, 113 S.Ct. 1505, *'1512)
<br />
<br />Page 8
<br />
<br />900, 904, 84 L.Ed. 1213] (1940).
<br />"If there is a kind of commercial speech that
<br />lacks all First Amendment protection,
<br />therefore it must be distinguished by its
<br />content. Yet the speech whose content
<br />deprives it of protection cann6t simply be
<br />speech on a commercial subject. No one
<br />would contend that our pharmacist may be
<br />prevented from being heard on the subject of
<br />whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices
<br />should be regulated, or their advertisement
<br />forbidden. Nor can it be dispositive that a
<br />commercial advertisement is noneditorial,
<br />and merely reports a fact. Purely factual
<br />matter of public interest may claim
<br />protection. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. [809],
<br />at 822 [95 S. Ct. 2222, 2232, 44 L.Ed. 2d 600
<br />(1975) ]; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
<br />102 [60 S. Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093] (1940)."
<br />Id., 425 U.S., at 761-762, 96 S. Ct., at 1825.
<br />
<br />We then held that even speech that does no
<br />more than propose a commercial transaction is
<br />protected by the First Amendment. /d., at
<br />762, 96 S.Ct., at 1825. [FN17]
<br />
<br />FN17. Justice BLACKMUN, writing for the Court
<br />in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97
<br />S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), summarized the
<br />reasons for extending First Amendment protection to
<br />"core" commercial speech:
<br />"The listener's interest [in commercial speech] is
<br />substantial: the consumer's concern for the free flow
<br />of commercial speech often may be far keener than
<br />his concern for urgent political dialogue.
<br />Moreover, significant societal interests are served by
<br />such speech. Advertising, though entirely
<br />commercial, may often carry information of import
<br />to significant issues of the day. See Bigelow v.
<br />Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 [95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d
<br />600] (1975). And commercial speech serves to
<br />inform the public of the availability, nature, and
<br />prices of products and services, and thus performs
<br />an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in
<br />a free enterprise system. See FTC v. Procter &
<br />Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603-604 [87 S.Ct. 1224,
<br />1243, 18 L.Ed.2d 303] (1967) (Harlan, J.,
<br />concurring). In short, such speech serves individual
<br />and societal interests in assuring informed and
<br />reliable decisionmaking." M., 433 U.S., at 364, 97
<br />S.Ct., at 2699.
<br />Of course, we were not the first to recognize the
<br />
<br />value of commercial speech:
<br />"'[Advertisements] are well calculated to enlarge
<br />and enlighten the public mind, and are worthy of
<br />being enumerated among the many methods of
<br />awakening and maintaining the popular attention,
<br />with which more modern times, beyond all preceding
<br />example, abound.'" D. Boorstin, The Americans:
<br />The Colonial Experience 328, 415 (1958), quoting I.
<br />Thomas, History of Printing in America with a
<br />Biography of Printers, and an Account of
<br />Newspapers (2d ed. 1810).
<br />
<br />*'1513 *422 In later opinions we have stated
<br />that speech proposing a commercial
<br />transaction is entitled to lesser protection than
<br />other constitutionally guaranteed expression.
<br />See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S.
<br />447, 455-456, 98 S. Ct. 1912, 1918, 56 L.Ed. 2d
<br />444 (1978). We have also suggested that such
<br />lesser protection was appropriate for a
<br />somewhat larger category of commercial
<br />speech--"that is, expression related solely to
<br />the economic interests of the speaker and its
<br />audience." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
<br />v. Public Service Cornm'n of New York, 447 U.S.,
<br />at 561, 100 S. Ct., at 2348. We did not,
<br />however, use that definition in either Bolger v.
<br />Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 103
<br />S. Ct. 2875, 77 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1983), or in Board
<br />of Trustees of State University of N. Y. v. Fox, 492
<br />U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed. 2d 388
<br />(1989).
<br />
<br />In the Bolger case we held that a federal
<br />statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited
<br />advertisements for contraceptives could not be
<br />applied to the appellee's promotional
<br />materials. Most of the appellee's mailings
<br />consisted primarily of price and quantity
<br />information, and thus fell "within the core
<br />notion of commercial speech--'speech which
<br />does "no more than propose a commercial
<br />transaction.' .... Bolger, 463 U.S., at 66, 103
<br />S. Ct., at 2880 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425
<br />U.S., at 762, 96 S. Ct., at 1825, in turn quoting
<br />Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comrn'n on
<br />Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 93 S. Ct.
<br />2553, 2558, 37 L. Ed.2d 669 (1973)). Relying
<br />in part on the appellee's economic motivation,
<br />the Court also answered the "closer question"
<br />about the proper *423 label for informational
<br />pamphlets that were concededly
<br />
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