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113 S.Ct. 1505
<br />(Cite as: 507 U.S. 410, '419, 113 S.Ct. 1505, *'1511)
<br />
<br />Page 7
<br />
<br />commercial speech.
<br />
<br />This very case illustrates the difficulty of
<br />drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin
<br />commercial speech in a distinct category. For
<br />respondents' publications shar~ important
<br />characteristics with the publications that the
<br />city classifies as "newspapers." Particularly,
<br />they are "commercial handbills" within the
<br />meaning of § 714-1-C of the city's code because
<br />they contain advertising, a feature that
<br />apparently also places ordinary newspapers
<br />within the same category. [FN14] Separate
<br />provisions in the code specifically authorize
<br />the distribution of "newspapers" on the public
<br />right of way, but that term is not defined.
<br />[FN15] Presumably, respondents' publications
<br />do not qualify as newspapers because an
<br />examination of their content discloses a higher
<br />ratio of advertising to other text, such as news
<br />and feature stories, than is found in the
<br />exempted publications. [FN16] Indeed,
<br />Cincinnati's City *420 Manager has
<br />determined that publications that qualify as
<br />newspapers and therefore can be distributed
<br />by newsrack are those that are published daily
<br />and/or weekly and "primarily presen[t]
<br />coverage of, and commentary on, current
<br />events." App. 230 (emphasis added).
<br />
<br />FN14. See n. 2, supra.
<br />
<br />FN15. Cincinnati Municipal Code § 862-1 (1992)
<br />provides:
<br />"Permission is hereby granted to any person or
<br />persons lawfully authorized to engage in the business
<br />of selling newspapers to occupy space on the
<br />sidewalks of city streets for selling newspapers,
<br />either in the morning or afternoon, where permission
<br />has been obtained from the owner or tenant of the
<br />adjoining building."
<br />
<br />FN16. Some ordinary newspapers try to maintain a
<br />ratio of 70% advertising to 30% editorial content.
<br />See generally C. Fink, Strategic Newspaper
<br />Management 43 (1988).
<br />
<br />The absence of a categorical definition of the
<br />difference between "newspapers" and
<br />"commercial handbills" in the city's code is
<br />also a characteristic of our opinions
<br />considering the constitutionality of
<br />
<br />regulations of commercial speech. Fifty years
<br />ago, we concluded that the distribution of a
<br />commercial *'1512 handbill was unprotected
<br />by the First Amendment, even though half of
<br />its content consisted of political protest.
<br />Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 62 S. Ct.
<br />920, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942). A few years later,
<br />over Justice Black's dissent, we held that the
<br />"commercial feature" of door-to-door
<br />solicitation of magazine subscriptions was a
<br />sufficient reason for denying First
<br />Amendment protection to that activity. Breard
<br />v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S.Ct. 920, 95
<br />L.Ed. 1233 (1951). Subsequent opinions,
<br />however, recognized that important
<br />commercial attributes of various forms of
<br />communication do not qualify their
<br />entitlement to constitutional protection. Thus,
<br />in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
<br />Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96
<br />S. Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1976), we
<br />explained:
<br />"We begin with several propositions that
<br />already are settled or beyond serious dispute.
<br />It is clear, for example, that speech does not
<br />lose its First Amendment protection because
<br />money is spent to project it, as in a paid
<br />advertisement of one form or another. Buckley
<br />v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-59 [96 S. Ct. 612, 642-
<br />654, 46 L.Ed. 2d 659] (1976); Pittsburgh Press
<br />Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. [376],
<br />at 384 [93 S. Ct. 2553, 2558, 37 L.Ed. 2d 669
<br />(1973) ]; Ne~ York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
<br />U.S. [254], at 266 [84 S. Ct. 710, 718, 11
<br />L.Ed. 2d 686 (1964) ]. Speech likewise is
<br />protected even though it is carried in a form
<br />that is 'sold' for profit, Smith v. California, 361
<br />U.S. 147, 150 [80 S. Ct. 215, 217, 4 L.Ed. 2d
<br />205] (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
<br />Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501172 S.Ct. 777, 780,
<br />96 L.Ed. 1098] (1952) (motion pictures);
<br />Murdock v. '421 Penn~2lvania, 319 U.S. [105],
<br />at 111 [63 S.Ct. 870, 874, 87 L. Ed. 1292
<br />(1943) ] (religious literature), and even
<br />though it may involve a solicitation to
<br />purchase or otherwise pay or contribute
<br />money. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra;
<br />NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 [83 S.Ct.
<br />328, 335, 9 L.Ed. 2d 405] (1963); Jamison v.
<br />Texas, 318 U.S. [413], at 417 [63 S. Ct. 669,
<br />672, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943) ]; Cantwell v.
<br />Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-307 [60 S. Ct.
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