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M,erican Planing Asenuavion 29 <br />property as a condition of approving the con- <br />struction of a house. New York's Court of <br />Appeals ruled in the town's favor in Decem- <br />ber in Smith v. Town of Mendon. Three of the <br />judges on the seven-member court dissented <br />sharply, however, arguing chat the restriction <br />was a taking under established U.S. Supreme <br />Court precedents. <br />The judges' discussion of those precedents <br />is significant because the Supreme Court has <br />not yet squarely addressed the consticutional- <br />ir -onditions imposed on permit applica- <br />tic :hat fall short of a landowner's forced <br />dedication of property to a municipality or <br />some ocher emiry. <br />Paul and Janet Smith applied for site plan <br />approval to build a house on their 9.7-acre <br />parcel in Mendon (pop. 8,370), 12 miles south <br />of Rochester. In the past 20 years, the town has <br />made a concerted effort to retain i[s semi-rural <br />character, using tools such as environmemal <br />protection overlay districts (EPODs). The <br />EPODs restrict construction on steep slopes, <br />sensitive lands bordering a major creek, estab- <br />lished wooded areas, and kloodplains. They <br />bar any land disturbance in these districts, <br />unless it is shown that the activity would not <br />harm the protected land and that there is no <br />reasonable ahernative to the activity. <br />Some of the Smiths' lot is subject to the <br />EPODs, but they had planned to build on the <br />non-EPOD portion. Aker reviewing the plan, <br />the Mendon planning board concluded that <br />the construction was not likely to result in any <br />adverse environmental impacts. Nevertheless, <br />the board required that the Smiths file a <br />cor~ ~-vation restriction on any development <br />wi the EPOD areas. The restriction would <br />also legally bind subsequem owners. <br />The Smiths sued, claiming the restriction <br />was an unconstitutional taking. The trial court <br />dismissed the case, but the intermediate ap- <br />pellatecourt affirmed [hat there was no taking <br />30 PlvnninG March 2005 <br /> <br />because the restticricrn was reasonably related <br />to the rowels goal of preserving environmen- <br />tally sensitive land. <br />5 lDe- ~~l rl ,a .. .a .t. C, <br />t ~_ <br />The Court of Appeals rejected the Smiths' <br />argument that the conserva[ion restriction <br />was an exaction according [o the standards <br />set in 1987 by rbe Supreme Court in Nollan <br />v. California CoartaL Commission and in Dolan <br />v. City ofTigard, a 1994 Oregon case. Exac- <br />tions, the New York court said, are land-use <br />decisions that condition development approval <br />velopment restrictions, and give the town <br />an effective means of enforcing its EPOD <br />regulations. <br />, 1;. !' e. t)96I1 44 .d4 :e4IIi <br />There were two dissenting opinions. Judge <br />Susan Read, joined b}' Judge Robert Smith, <br />contended that the case fell squarely within <br />the Nollan/Dolan takings analysis. The re- <br />striction was a conservation easement as de- <br />fined by New York's environmental conserva- <br />[ionlaw, Read stated. "Themajoriry isthetefore <br />simply wrong when it asserts chat the town is <br />not requiring a dedication ofproperty m pub- <br />~5~~` a"ap'~~ a €66M~~GC`i:~~.'f~ l~~€~$ a~lf'~`E° ~a'i~.!~s <br />J~cf~ ~.eJd@~e~J,~'l ~~~+4'~ fe~p~q°~° s~p~yC" °.'I;°> ~~`€t;',y~p$k6F/N~ <br />hYG~i^.d' Laf b:~SA i~k 1,.~ S£t 'P. r~G ~~ ~iY~Y~~P~ ~' s,`~~1~~'lG ~D S.} <br />x .. <br /> <br />on the dedication of property to public use. <br />Such conditions may be unconstitutional in a <br />narrow class of cases. <br />In Nollan, the commission refused to <br />permit construction unless the landowner <br />grained an easement for a public pathway. <br />In Dolan, the city conditioned a permit on <br />the owner's dedication of part of her prop- <br />erty for improvements to a srorm drainage <br />s}'stem and a bicycle path. Both anions <br />were ruled takings. <br />In contrast, the Smith case dealt with no <br />actual dedication of land [o public use, the <br />court said. Under the town's restriction, <br />the Smiths could still exclude others loom <br />their land. The court said it saw no reason <br />co extend the concept of exactions in a case <br />where the restriction merely put conditions <br />on development. <br />Therefore, the court said, it would examine <br />the development condition under the stan- <br />dard the Supreme Court laid down in 1980 in <br />Aginr v. Cit)~ of Tiburon. First, contrary to the <br />Aginr standards, the resu~iaion did not reduce <br />the value of the Smiths' property very much, <br />let almte deny them economically viable use <br />of it. Given the resu'ictions the EPOD ordi- <br />nance already imposed, the parts of the prop- <br />erty covered by the new restriction had little <br />development value an}nvay. <br />Second, the restriction substantially ad- <br />vanced a legitimate government interest: It <br />would preserve sensitive areas in perpem- <br />iry, put future buyers on notice of the de- <br />lit use," when it requires such an easement, <br />she said. <br />Judge Read also disagreed with the majority's <br />view that a permit condition does not amount <br />to an exaction unless it infringes on the prop- <br />erty owner's right co exclude others or man- <br />dates public access. <br />in Smith, Judge Read said, the site plan ap- <br />proval was conditioned on giving the rown a <br />conservation easement, and that amounted to <br />an exaction. In takings jurisprudence, "public <br />use" is synonymous with public purpose or <br />public bene5t. The easemen[ was in fact a <br />dedication of property to a public use-its <br />entire justification was to confer an environ- <br />mental benefc[ on [he public. <br />The restriction would serve a legitimate <br />rown interest, Judge Read conrinued~ Rut, as <br />in Nollan, there was no "essential nexus" be- <br />tween the exaction and the harm, if any, the <br />proposed construction might cause. <br />In the other dissenting opinion, Judge <br />Victoria Graffeo argued that the town's ac- <br />tion amounted m a taking even under the <br />Agins standard because the restriction failed <br />to advance the town's interest further than <br />did the existing EPOD regulations. "Ad hoc <br />imposition of a conserva[ion restriction as a <br />condition m site plan approval does not fur- <br />ther additional legitimaceenvironmental con- <br />cerns in a meaningful v~ay and is simply over- <br />kill," she declared. <br />