M,erican Planing Asenuavion 29
<br />property as a condition of approving the con-
<br />struction of a house. New York's Court of
<br />Appeals ruled in the town's favor in Decem-
<br />ber in Smith v. Town of Mendon. Three of the
<br />judges on the seven-member court dissented
<br />sharply, however, arguing chat the restriction
<br />was a taking under established U.S. Supreme
<br />Court precedents.
<br />The judges' discussion of those precedents
<br />is significant because the Supreme Court has
<br />not yet squarely addressed the consticutional-
<br />ir -onditions imposed on permit applica-
<br />tic :hat fall short of a landowner's forced
<br />dedication of property to a municipality or
<br />some ocher emiry.
<br />Paul and Janet Smith applied for site plan
<br />approval to build a house on their 9.7-acre
<br />parcel in Mendon (pop. 8,370), 12 miles south
<br />of Rochester. In the past 20 years, the town has
<br />made a concerted effort to retain i[s semi-rural
<br />character, using tools such as environmemal
<br />protection overlay districts (EPODs). The
<br />EPODs restrict construction on steep slopes,
<br />sensitive lands bordering a major creek, estab-
<br />lished wooded areas, and kloodplains. They
<br />bar any land disturbance in these districts,
<br />unless it is shown that the activity would not
<br />harm the protected land and that there is no
<br />reasonable ahernative to the activity.
<br />Some of the Smiths' lot is subject to the
<br />EPODs, but they had planned to build on the
<br />non-EPOD portion. Aker reviewing the plan,
<br />the Mendon planning board concluded that
<br />the construction was not likely to result in any
<br />adverse environmental impacts. Nevertheless,
<br />the board required that the Smiths file a
<br />cor~ ~-vation restriction on any development
<br />wi the EPOD areas. The restriction would
<br />also legally bind subsequem owners.
<br />The Smiths sued, claiming the restriction
<br />was an unconstitutional taking. The trial court
<br />dismissed the case, but the intermediate ap-
<br />pellatecourt affirmed [hat there was no taking
<br />30 PlvnninG March 2005
<br />
<br />because the restticricrn was reasonably related
<br />to the rowels goal of preserving environmen-
<br />tally sensitive land.
<br />5 lDe- ~~l rl ,a .. .a .t. C,
<br />t ~_
<br />The Court of Appeals rejected the Smiths'
<br />argument that the conserva[ion restriction
<br />was an exaction according [o the standards
<br />set in 1987 by rbe Supreme Court in Nollan
<br />v. California CoartaL Commission and in Dolan
<br />v. City ofTigard, a 1994 Oregon case. Exac-
<br />tions, the New York court said, are land-use
<br />decisions that condition development approval
<br />velopment restrictions, and give the town
<br />an effective means of enforcing its EPOD
<br />regulations.
<br />, 1;. !' e. t)96I1 44 .d4 :e4IIi
<br />There were two dissenting opinions. Judge
<br />Susan Read, joined b}' Judge Robert Smith,
<br />contended that the case fell squarely within
<br />the Nollan/Dolan takings analysis. The re-
<br />striction was a conservation easement as de-
<br />fined by New York's environmental conserva-
<br />[ionlaw, Read stated. "Themajoriry isthetefore
<br />simply wrong when it asserts chat the town is
<br />not requiring a dedication ofproperty m pub-
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<br />on the dedication of property to public use.
<br />Such conditions may be unconstitutional in a
<br />narrow class of cases.
<br />In Nollan, the commission refused to
<br />permit construction unless the landowner
<br />grained an easement for a public pathway.
<br />In Dolan, the city conditioned a permit on
<br />the owner's dedication of part of her prop-
<br />erty for improvements to a srorm drainage
<br />s}'stem and a bicycle path. Both anions
<br />were ruled takings.
<br />In contrast, the Smith case dealt with no
<br />actual dedication of land [o public use, the
<br />court said. Under the town's restriction,
<br />the Smiths could still exclude others loom
<br />their land. The court said it saw no reason
<br />co extend the concept of exactions in a case
<br />where the restriction merely put conditions
<br />on development.
<br />Therefore, the court said, it would examine
<br />the development condition under the stan-
<br />dard the Supreme Court laid down in 1980 in
<br />Aginr v. Cit)~ of Tiburon. First, contrary to the
<br />Aginr standards, the resu~iaion did not reduce
<br />the value of the Smiths' property very much,
<br />let almte deny them economically viable use
<br />of it. Given the resu'ictions the EPOD ordi-
<br />nance already imposed, the parts of the prop-
<br />erty covered by the new restriction had little
<br />development value an}nvay.
<br />Second, the restriction substantially ad-
<br />vanced a legitimate government interest: It
<br />would preserve sensitive areas in perpem-
<br />iry, put future buyers on notice of the de-
<br />lit use," when it requires such an easement,
<br />she said.
<br />Judge Read also disagreed with the majority's
<br />view that a permit condition does not amount
<br />to an exaction unless it infringes on the prop-
<br />erty owner's right co exclude others or man-
<br />dates public access.
<br />in Smith, Judge Read said, the site plan ap-
<br />proval was conditioned on giving the rown a
<br />conservation easement, and that amounted to
<br />an exaction. In takings jurisprudence, "public
<br />use" is synonymous with public purpose or
<br />public bene5t. The easemen[ was in fact a
<br />dedication of property to a public use-its
<br />entire justification was to confer an environ-
<br />mental benefc[ on [he public.
<br />The restriction would serve a legitimate
<br />rown interest, Judge Read conrinued~ Rut, as
<br />in Nollan, there was no "essential nexus" be-
<br />tween the exaction and the harm, if any, the
<br />proposed construction might cause.
<br />In the other dissenting opinion, Judge
<br />Victoria Graffeo argued that the town's ac-
<br />tion amounted m a taking even under the
<br />Agins standard because the restriction failed
<br />to advance the town's interest further than
<br />did the existing EPOD regulations. "Ad hoc
<br />imposition of a conserva[ion restriction as a
<br />condition m site plan approval does not fur-
<br />ther additional legitimaceenvironmental con-
<br />cerns in a meaningful v~ay and is simply over-
<br />kill," she declared.
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