5.4. SR 05-17-2010 - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

not. Id. Instead, the City staff simply represented that the ERL and Tiller had to reapply with the full expansion request. Id. 4. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION NO. 4: Ambiguities are to be construed consistent with its contract obligations Any ambiguity is to be interpreted, where possible, so as not to conflict with the zoning body's contractual or other requirements. See Strauss v. GinzbeNg, 218 Minn. ~7, 64, 15 N.W.2d 130, li4 (1944) ("The zoning ordinance cannot affect the obligation created by such restrictions [in covenant contained in deeds and cannot impair the contractual obligations so created"). Even though there is no other room for landfill expansion on the existing 1.37.4-acre landfill property, the City previously represented to this Court that the parties' 2003 Host Community Agreement's "language clearly refers to 'ex~~ansions ... on the L,andf ll ro ert ,"' not to "expansions" on the 108.8-acre SDA property. l/4/10 City ERL I Proposed Memo and Order at 26-27; 12/17/09 City ERL I oral argument. The City's judicial admissions would be nonsensical, if not disingenuous, if (as it now claims) the State-mandated 200-foot buffer had to be within the SWF overlay district; thereby barring any "expansions ... on the Landfill property."~ The City's "cooperation" obligation under the 2003 Host Community Agreement would also be rendered moot by Statements contained in a party's pleadings are binding on that party, and they are considered judicia] admissions., Knzrdserz v. United Stales, 254 P.3d 747, 752 (8th Cir. 2001); In r•e Crawford, 274 B.R. 798, 804-OS (Banks. 8th Cir. 2002); Bellefonte Reinsztrnnce Co. v. Argonaztt Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 523, 528 (2d Cir. 1985); Postscript Enters. v. City of I3ridgelon, 90S F.2d 223, 227-28 (8th Cir. 1990) (treating statements by parties made in briefs as judicial admission). "Judicial efficiency demands that a party not be allowed to conU•ovet•t what it has ah•eady unequivocally told a court by the most fo(ro~al and considered means possible." Knudsen, 254 P.3d at 752 (quoting Soo LHze R. R. Co. v. St. Lozris Sw~. Ry. Co., 12S F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997)). And the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel prevents a party from taking inconsistent positions in the same or related litigation. State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 462 (Minn. 1999): Hossnini v. W. Ago. riled. Ctr•., ] 40 P.3d 1140, 1142 (8th Cir. 1998); Bates v. Long lslcrnd R.R. Cn., 997 F.2d 1028, 1037 (2d Cir. 1993). Judicial estoppel is invoked "to protect the integrity of the .judicial process from a party who plays fast and loose with the courts." Profit, S91 N. W.2d at 462; Hossnini, 140 F.3d at 1143. The pwposes of the doctrine of judicial estoppel are [o preserve judicial integrity by avoiding the risk of inconsistent results in two proceedings. Hossaini, 140 F.3d at 1142; Sirnon v. Safelite Gloss Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1997). "[A]bsent any good explanation, a party should not be allowed to gain an advantage by litigation on one theory, and then seen an inconsistent advantage by pursuing an incompatible theory." 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & G. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4477 at 782. This approach focuses "directly on the risk of inconsistent results and the perceived unseemliness of a litigant's conduct." Id. at 781. T:\0742\1406\CiiyApprebU°G6 Report_final (2).doc 3-2C