5.4. SR 05-17-2010 - Laserfiche WebLink

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circumstances, the fact that the district court did not include those 'magic words' but ordered the entry of judgment anyway, is another reflection that the district court likel believed that its decision was final 'so far as the court issuing the order is concerned"') (emphasis added). There are, however, several aspects of the district court's order which lead to the exact opposite conclusion. Tellingly, the district court's purported issuance of permanent mandatory injunction under declaratory judgment would have, according to City, issued (1}without authority under ch. 555, (2) without briefing or oral argument on the issue, (3) without analysis of or ruling on any of the injunction factors, (4) without a bond, and (5) in contravention of its denial of ERL's related mandamus claim. And an injunction does not "automatic[ally]" follow from a declaratory judgment in the zoning context. See, e.g., Bosse v. City of OtterTail, No. A07-2248, 2008 WL 2889474, at *4 (Minn. App. July 29, 2008) (Attach. 4) ("permanent injunctive relief for a zoning-ordinance violation [determined per a declaratory judgment ruling] is not automatic and, like all claims for such relief, requires a showing that there is no adequate legal remedy and that an injunction is necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury"}. D. ERL's ost-decision communications with the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency do not support City's contention that the district court issued an "effect(ivel" permanent mandatory injunction Based on its improper submission of post-decision evidence (Clark Aff. Ex. B),Z City charges that the "efforts by fERLI to leave out the words of the declaratory judgment 2 E1ZL, objects to and hereby moves to strike this post-decision communication and all references thereto. This Court should disregard and strike City's extra-record evidence presented. See Fluoroware, Inc. v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 545 N.W.2d 678, 684 7