6.6. SR 03-15-2010 - Laserfiche WebLink

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owner has procured a lawfully issued permit and has commenced substantial construction in reliance upon the permit. a. For example, in Ridgewood Development Co. v. State, 294 N.W.2d 288, 294 (Minn. 1980), the plaintiff spent $250,000 preparing for construction before the law governing its proposed development became more burdensome, and asserted a vested right to be governed by preexisting law. Because the plaintiff had obtained no building permit and had not yet begun constz-uction, no right had vested. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated that "the mere possession of a building permit, the incurring of some expense and the assumption of obligations preliminary to construction, such as excavation, create no vested right." Id. Accordingly, the state could amend its laws and impose greater burdens upon the property owner. Accord We~mayeN v. Cormorant Township, 716 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir, 1983). b. In Hawkinson v. County of Itasca, Minn., 231 N.W.2d 279 (Minn. 1975), the developer spent $80,000 (in 1975 dollars), plus time worth an additional $20,000, improving his land for commercial purposes in a project which was intended to cost $275,000. The Supreme Court concluded that "the expenses plaintiff incurred by way of preparation did not result in prejudice so substantial as to permit him to complete the project" as a nonconforming use under a new ordinance which zoned the property residential. Id. at 284. c. In Almquist, the fact that the developer had incurred expenses surveying the property, plus considerable time and energy pursuing the development plan for six months, was not sufficient to give rise to a vested right to have his request for a special use permit governed by the law then in place. Almquist, 308 Minn. at 70, 245 N.W.2d at 828. d. However, the Court of Appeals has ruled that this doctrine can never enable a developer to protect its