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~il~!I <br />/". <br />6 <br />~~h' <br />1!'I <br />teristics. Many believe that capacity <br />markets need to have the ability to rec- <br />ognizefuel and operating diversity to <br />avoid dependenry on one fuel type and <br />to maintain a fleet of resources that is <br />capable of meeting all of the needs of the <br />system operator in terms of ability to <br />start quickly and follow load. <br />Demand Curve. Finally, there has <br />been one other major shortcoming <br />observed in capacity market design that <br />occurs on the demand side of the equa- <br />tion, asopposed to the supply side <br />issues like those already discussed. Most <br />markets have utilized what is referred to <br />as a "vertical demand curve" to date. <br />This term refers to the construction of <br />most markets where demand is set <br />equal to the target reserve margin <br />which, in effect, creates a fixed quantity <br />that is completely price insensitive. <br />While a description of the full <br />dynamic of the pricing structures of <br />demand curves are beyond the scope of <br />this article, the vertical demand curve <br />typically has created very volatile pric- <br />ing. Historical pricing patterns in exist- <br />ing capacity markets have tended to be <br />shaped by boom/bust or floor/ceiling <br />behavior where prices hover near zero <br />when the market is oversupplied and <br />jump to the capped price or deficienry <br />level when the market passes through <br />equilibrium and enters a period of <br />shortage. This binary pricing pattern <br />produces unwanted volatility that <br />reduces the predictability of revenues <br />for suppliers. Reduced predictability <br />undermines new entrant planning or <br />forces builders to raise costs by includ- <br />ing apremium to cover this price risk. <br />Capacity Market Evolution <br />In response to these perceived short- <br />comings, many markets are consider- <br />ing, or already are undergoing, massive <br />overhauls. Some are adding capacity <br />markets for the first time, while others <br />are adding new features to existing mar- <br />kets. These overhauls are~spurring a new <br />round of thinking on calpacity market <br />design that appears to be leading to <br />interesting-and increasjngly com- <br />plex-new designs. While the final <br />direction of the markers t•emalns to be <br />seen, what is becoming a,~parent is a <br />natural evolution in cap city market <br />form and function. I <br />The bottom of the evdlutionary lad- <br />der (see Figure 1) can be defined as begin- <br />ningwith NoCAP markets as seen in <br />California and ERCOT. Given the issues <br />associated with price caps in most mar- <br />kets, this structure appears to be insuffi- <br />cient. From there we move up the evolu- <br />tionaryscale to simple, pool-wide capac- <br />itymarkets like the current form of the <br />PJM installed (ICAP), or unforced <br />26 Pueuc Ununes Foeneaxnr Mnv 2005 <br />(UCAP), market. But, as discussed <br />above, this relatively simple structure <br />addresses the question ofvolume only. <br />The locational ICAP market <br />(LICAP) structure that follows the rela- <br />tivelysimplistic ICAP/UCAP model <br />adds a locational component to the <br />pricing structure to add criteria for <br />determining where in the pool new <br />resources are constructed. The pro- <br />posed system in New England, as well <br />as the current system in New York, are <br />examples of this LICAP approach. <br />In addition to addressing location, <br />the LICAP phase also has included <br />modifications to the market-demand <br />curve. By constructing what is referred <br />to as a "sloped" or "curved" demand <br />curve, market designers are attempting <br />to fine-tune the timing of the new build <br />signal and eliminate the binary pricing <br />behavior observed in markets with verti- <br />cal-demand curves. The sloped-demand <br />curve attempts to add subtlety to the <br />market signals by producing increas- <br />ingly high levels of compensation for <br />generators when the market moves <br />towards scarcity levels, and by gradually <br />decreasing levels of compensation when <br />resources are adequate. <br />PJM now is considering taking this <br />a step further, to what can be referred <br />to as "LICAP Plus." If the original PJM <br />structure simply addressed the issue of <br />how much, and the New York/New <br />England LICAP markets add function- <br />ality for addressing when and where, <br />the new PJM design also will help <br />determine what type. The scheme <br />under discussion in PJM is designed <br />to address the operational flexibility <br />of the resources that are built. The <br />proposal includes criteria to provide <br />price distinction based on the ability <br />of resources to follow load or provide <br />quick-start functionality. This will <br />help ensure that the generation mix <br />as a whole is diverse enough to <br />provide the full range of resources <br />www.fortnightly.com <br />