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Capacity Markets: <br />A Bridge to Recovery? <br />A review of the ongoing evolution of market design. <br />BY CRAIG HART <br />ICAP, ICAP, UCAP, NoCAP. <br />Some markets have them, some <br />don't. Where they do exist, no <br />two are equal. <br />California was built without one, as <br />were the markets of Australia and New <br />Zealand. Northeastern U.S. markets all <br />have them, albeit in slightly different <br />variations. MISO will start one of the <br />biggest energy markets in the world <br />without one. PJM, long considered the <br />model market, is debating a major over- <br />haul to its current scheme. Others are <br />considering such changes as well. <br />As the experimentation with whole- <br />sale energy market deregulation contin- <br />ues, anevolutionary trend in capacity <br />market design is becoming apparent in <br />the United States. Most critics now <br />support the conclusion that en re~gy <br />only schemes in price-capped markets <br />do not provide sufficient revenues to <br />rn uce new generation and keep sys- <br />tem-critical, high-cost generation <br />resources in the market. As such, it is <br />likely only a matter of time before <br />energy on y mar ets are extinct. <br />ut, w i e it appears at capacity <br />markets are here to stay, there is little <br />consensus regarding the best design. <br />Markets in the United States are in a <br />state of flux, with debate raging over <br />many different capacity market pricing <br />schemes. The pool-wide, single-price <br />capacity market model utilized by PJM <br />and others now appears too simplistic. <br />New designs are calling for <br />ever-more complicated structures aimed <br />at fine-tuning the location, the timing, <br />and the type of generation resources <br />that capacity markets induce. <br />While the winning recipe has yet to <br />be selected, it is likely that participants <br />in certain markets will witness signifi- <br />cantchanges. In certain load pockets, <br />generators could see a meaningful <br />increase in gross margins if a pricing <br />scheme that compensates generators <br />based on location is adopted. Flexible <br />units may receive an additional bump <br />if changes being considered in PJM are <br />adopted. But, these shifts are likely only <br />to persist in the shoe to medium term. <br />While providing a much needed bridge <br />to market recovery For some, if the mar- <br />kets function properly, price differentials <br />should dissipate over time and bring <br />long-term pricing back to the mean. <br />Background <br />Capacity markets are designed to ensure <br />resource adequary. While various defi- <br />nitions exist, resource adequacy gener- <br />ally refers to the sufficiency of <br />generation resources to meet the peak <br />energy needs and maintain the stability <br />of an electric system. <br />In a traditional, regulated utility <br />world, generation plants are added after <br />resource planners determine the <br />amount of new capacity that will be <br />needed over the coming years to meet <br />demand. While they are determining <br />the actual amount of total installed <br />capacity necessary to ensure resource <br />adequary, resource planners also attempt <br />to optimize the type of capacity that is <br />built in terms of fuel type, technology, <br />and market segment (i. e., baseload, <br />intermediate and peaking). In this <br />way, the best generation mix necessary <br />to meet peak demand is determined <br />through a central planning process. <br />In a deregulated world, the decision <br />to build new capacity is made by indi- <br />vidual market participants instead of <br />through a central planning process. <br />The underlying question becomes how <br />to design a market to properly incen- <br />tivize profit-maximizing participants to <br />develop enough generation capacity to <br />ensure resource adequacy As the theory <br />goes, the answer is that the market <br />must provide adequate compensation <br />so that a new entrant is able to earn rev- <br />enues that are high enough to cover <br />costs and earn a fair return. <br />74vo Basic Models <br />There are essentially two schools of <br />thought when it comes to designing <br />markets that provide adequate revenues <br />to generators: energy only (referred <br />to as "NoCAP") and energy-plus- <br />capacirymarkets.' <br />Many have followed the NoCAP <br />route. In the United States, California, <br />ERCOT, and MISO started without an <br />explicit capacity market. Australia and <br />New Zealand, as well as the markets in <br />Ontario, Alberta and Scandinavia <br />(NORDPOOL) all have functioned <br />without a formal capacity support <br />mechanism. The general belief (hope) in <br />these NoCAP markets is that sufFicient <br />revenues will be earned from the energy <br />markets (plus other ancillary services <br />where applicable) alone to induce an <br />adequate amount of new generation <br />resources. The idea is that the inherent <br />volatility of the energy markets will <br />deliver enough high-priced hours dur- <br />ingsummer- orwinter-peaking periods <br />24 Pueuc Ununes FoprNiexnr MAV 2005 www.fortnightly.com <br />