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ERMUSR Misc Issues 02-08-2005
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ERMUSR Misc Issues 02-08-2005
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Can Competition <br />Be Made To Work? .,,o~.,.„, <br />The promise of competition has <br />been center stage during more than a <br />decade of misadventures with electric <br />utility industry deregulation. It has <br />been used to rally support and chas- <br />tise doubters. But a clear statement of <br />what competition means was rarely <br />offered. Moreover, the assumption <br />that it can be made to work has not <br />been examined carefully. A clear and <br />appropriate definition of competition <br />is needed to judge whether the re- <br />sults of electricity deregulation <br />comport with what would occur in <br />truly competitive markets. <br />Advocates of deregulation rarely pro- <br />vide aclear statement of the benefits or <br />delivery date of competition. Lower rates <br />and more choices were touted as primary <br />benefits, but when skyrocketing prices ar- <br />rived instead, unproved efficiency and <br />proper price signals became the new ra]- <br />ly2ngcry. <br />Competition was good, the promoters <br />of deregulation reminded us, because en- <br />trepreneurs working in their own <br />self-interest are guided by the invisible <br />hand of the market, as described more <br />than two centuries ago by Adam Smith, <br />and such pursuits lead to efficient pro- <br />duction and prosperity. <br />Usually ignored, however, was Smith's <br />caution that rarely do people in the same <br />industry meet that their conversation <br />does not turn to conspiring to raise <br />prices. Also given short shrift were the <br />conditions under which adequate compe- <br />tition is likely to exist. Proponents of <br />deregulation ignored the history of pri- <br />vate monopoly abuse. <br />More recently, competition advocates <br />have forgotten one of the cardinal bene- <br />fits of competition-that it coordinates <br />economic activities in industries so there <br />is little or no need for government regu- <br />lation or entry. They neglect this, perhaps <br />because deregulatory efforts demonstrate <br />the need for government intervention. <br />The market has not automatically pro- <br />vided essential facilities and coordinated <br />www. A P PAn et. o rg <br />activities reduired to provide electricity <br />that is reliable, environmentally respon- <br />sible, efficiently produced and efficiently <br />priced. <br />The industry is plagued with nagging <br />problems of adequacy of reserve capacity, <br />construction of new transmission facili- <br />ties, reliability of day-to-day operations, <br />future generating capacity, and collateral <br />harm to the environment If markets are <br />in fact competitive, these problems would <br />not exist. <br />These problems, along with the Califor- <br />nia fiasco, Enron scandals, manipulation <br />of price data, skyrocketing wholesale <br />prices, and the wave of industry mergers, <br />indicate something was fundamentally <br />wrong with initial assumptions about com- <br />petition in electric power markets. <br />There are no such things as pure mo- <br />nopoly or pure competition. These are <br />theoretical concepts at opposite ends of <br />an economic spectrmn. Consumers and <br />enterprises live their real economic lives <br />somewhere between these extremes. The <br />notion of "workable competition" at- <br />tempts to bring real-world practicality to <br />the economic notion of competition. <br />More formally, economist John <br />Maurice Clark defined y~~orkable com- <br />petition several decades ago as a "rivalry <br />in selling goods, in which each selling <br />unit normally seeks maximum net rev- <br />enue." But he emphasized that the <br />prices each seller can charge are effec- <br />tively limited by the free option of the <br />buyer to buy the same product from a <br />rival seller. This necessitates "an effort <br />by each seller to equal or exceed the at- <br />tractiveness of the others' offerings." <br />Clark conceded that his definition may <br />not be complete, but "it focuses attention <br />on a crucial point which is sometimes ne- <br />glected, namely the nature of the option <br />actually open to the buyer." ("Toward a <br />Concept of Workable Competition," Tl~ie <br />American Econor~nic Review 30, Issue 2 <br />(June 1940), 242.1 <br />Clark's definition captured the essen- <br />tial attributes of competition and implied <br />other attributes that further define it. <br />The rivalry he described implied that <br />suppliers do not have effective control <br />over market prices-they are "price tak- <br />ers." 7~here is a true rivalry for customers <br />and sales so goods and services will be <br />produced efficiently and market prices <br />will reflect the minimum cost necessary <br />to attract suppliers. There is also the im- <br />plication that enterprises are responsive <br />to consumer demands. <br />Following Clark's lead, other econo- <br />mists have studied industry behavior and <br />performance to determine if the results <br />are consistent with what would be ex- <br />pected in workably competitive markets. <br />The behavioral and performance criteria <br />for such markets were smnmarized by <br />economist Frederic Scherer. As for be- <br />havior, enterprises do not collude to <br />keep prices high and maintain excessive <br />profits, nor engage in exclusionary, <br />predatory, oe coercive tactics. Neither do <br />they persist in harmful price discrimina- <br />tion. Information helps customers make <br />better choices about what and how <br />much to buy. <br />Competition leads to: efficient produc- <br />tion; output levels and quality responsive <br />to customer demands; profits sufficient to <br />attract and reward investment, efficiency <br />and innovation; prices that reflect costs; <br />opportunities for introducing technologi- <br />cally superior new products and <br />processes; promotional expenses that are <br />not excessive; and success for sellers who <br />best serve customer wants. <br />Clark's definition of competition is an <br />appropriate standard against which to <br />judge whether competition is present in <br />electric power markets. Scherers criteria <br />provide practical standards for judging. <br />Tuning to the question of whetl~rer <br />competition can be made to work <br />requires looking at the conditions <br />necessary for it to flourish. Important <br />influences include raw materials, <br />prevailing technologies, storability of <br />JANUAFV-FeeRUaav 2005 15 <br />
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