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<br />. It's a disincentive to inter-local cooperation, In any inter-local cooperative effort that could <br />be considered a "joint venture", the potential total liability exposure is apparently now equal <br />to the stanltory tort limit times the number of participating political subdivisions. In other <br />words, the total liability exposure that the cooperating political subdivisions must plan for <br />and fund is now significantly greater. <br /> <br />. It creates uneven results for claimants. E.g., if you have the misfortune to be run over by an <br />Metro Transit bus, you could recover up to $300,000; if you're run over by a bus operated by <br />a six-member joint powers entity, you could reco\'er up to $ 1.8 million. <br /> <br />. Although the court didn't define "joint venture" precisely. one section of the opinion <br />describes it as a "mutual unde11aking for a common purpose." This language is troubling <br />because it's so broad. It seems pretty clear that any agreement that creates ajoint pov...ers <br />entity - i.e., a joint board with the power to receive and expend funds, enter contracts, hire <br />employees, or own property - will be considered a "joint vennlre". Uut it's possible that <br />other types of intergovernmental cooperative arrangements \vill be affected as well. Even <br />providing assistance to a neighboring city under a muulal aid agreement arguably might <br />constitute a "muum\ undertaking for a common purpose," and therefore a 'joint venture" in <br />which all the members are vicariously liable for each others' actions. <br /> <br />. It increases the risk that a joint powers entity' s coverage limits could turn out not to be <br />enough. When LMCIT issues coverage for a joint powers entity, that coverage protects all of <br />the constituent political subdivisions as well for liability arising from the joint entity's <br />activities. In Ulrn, coverage for the joint powers entity's activities is excluded under the <br />individual city's own coverage. The goal is to be able to provide a single unified defense for <br />all of the parties, rather than having multiple attorneys defending each city separately. But <br />because of the "limit slacking" implication of the court's ruling, there's now a greater risk <br />that the joint entity's coverage limit might not be enough.' <br /> <br />Coverage issues for joint Jlowers agreements <br /> <br />.Mutual aid agreements. service C011lracts, and simi/arjoint pOll'ers agreements <br /> <br />The Reimer mling doesn't create any new coverage issues for most joint powers agreements, <br />including mutual aid agreements, agreements under which a city purchases service from or <br />provides service to another political subdivision, and so on. The ruling does increase the city's <br />I iability exposure under these contracts. since there' s now a risk that a city could be held liable <br />for its partner's actions under the Reimer ruling's "joint venU\fl~" theory. But the city's LMCIT <br />liability coverage would cover the city's potential vicarious liability for another political <br />subdivision's actions if this type ofagreemenl were deemed by the court to be a "joint venture". <br /> <br />I Of course, Iherc's always some risk that the coverage limit will turn Ollt to be inadequate. whether it's a joint <br />powers situation or an individual city, because some claims aren't capped by Ihe srannory limil. Federal civil rights <br />claims are an example. <br /> <br />2 <br />