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<br />Chapter 10 <br /> <br />Page 190[25 <br /> <br />predatory pricing features of Robinson-Patman Act; particularly with respect to the several different <br />approaches to calculating below cost sales on the "market basket" approach or the "single product" . <br />approach. The majority opinion in the Supreme Court reversal also acknowledged that, "Admittedly, <br />there is point where competitive pricing ends and predatory pricing begins." Further, Justice Robert <br />L. Brown's majority decision in favor ofWal-Mart also pointed out that the Eighth U.S. Circuit Court <br />of Appeals had discussed the difficulty in distinguishing the two in the context of the Sherman Act; <br />i.e. "Competitive pricing" vs. "Predatory pricing." Moreover, while a finding that a defendant has <br />engaged in selling below cost, is not the equivalent of finding specific predatory intent; nevertheless, <br />it could be a basis from which such intent might be inferred. <br /> <br />In the August 1994 House Small Business Committee Public Hearings and in Subsequent <br />Congressional Sessions. the Committee Lashed out at the Mega-Discount Superstore for <br />Hurting Small Businesses and Entire Communities with Predatory Pricing. Unfair Labor <br />Practices and Market Saturation <br /> <br />In Joyce Barrett's article on August 11, 1994 in Women's Wear Daily she reported on the first <br />Congressional probe of the retailing phenomenon that was changing local markets nationwide. The <br />mega-stores were blamed for everything from crushing local competition to altering the product <br />distribution chain. <br /> <br />As the largest retailer in the nation, according to Barrett, Wal-Mart Stores Iuc. drew most of the <br />~riticism, although Representative John Lafalce (D., NY), Chairman ofthe House Small Business <br />Committee Gaid he had hoped the discussion would not target specific retailers. Wal-Mart's projected <br />volume for thi~ year was $85 billion. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />Representative Lafalce said he aimed to explore three ways of protecting small business fram the <br />super-chains. <br /> <br />1. Increase publicity about expansion of the mega-stores. < <br />2. Curb federal money, sllch as industrial revenue bonds, that goes toward retail development. <br /> <br />3. Insure that federal antitrust and banking laws are tough enough and are enforced. <br /> <br />LaFalce acknowledged that the federal government can do little to affect the recent course of <br />retailing, but said he was concerned that superstore development was coming at the expense of <br />smal1er merchants. <br /> <br />At the hearings, which were commented on in Chapter VII, there was a litany of complaints about the <br />superstores. Thomas Muller, a Fairfax, V A, economist and the author of a report on the impact that <br />three proposed Wal-Mart stores would have on northeastern Vermont communities, said Wal-Mart <br />charged higher prices in communities where it has eliminated the competition. Also, Wal-Mart and <br />other mega-stores don't increase the dollar volume of sales, but instead redistribute sales. Further he <br />pointed out that the claim that Wal-Mart creates jobs also is wrong. Muller added that in communities <br />with a Wal-Mart the result could be fewer retail jobs. He also said that full-time jobs in the mega- <br />retail were often based on a 28-hour work week, instead of the usual 40 hours. He also observed that <br />based on its current marketing strategy, Wal-Mart could open another 5,000 stores within the next 10 . <br />to 15 years. Muller further estimated: <br /> <br />"...that Wal-Mart had reached optimum penetration levels' in Arkansas, Mississippi and <br /> <br />http://www.shilsreport.orglchapl0.html <br /> <br />10/6/99 <br />