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Chapter 10 Page 15 of25 this situation when a large well-known retail store enters a town, it captures a significant slice ofthe pie, thus leaving less sales for the other businesses." He also indicated that in smaller towns, with less than 5,000 in population, sales were lost even more rapidly. . Professor Stone's early studies (1992) anticipated the result ofWal-Mart's national growth into the east and west. There is simply not enough customer demand for smaller retailers to survive the competition ofWal-Mart, Kmart, Target and other discount chains where the retailers essentially sell the same products as are found in the major retail discount chains. In his earlier paper, "Strategies for Co-existing in a Mass Merchandising Environment,." Professor Stone was very direct in his admonition to small retailers. "Try not to handle the exact same merchandise. . . (or if it's a similar product) then sell another brand. "26 Both Chapters III and IV presented the ever increasing concerns of small retailers for sUlvival. The data in Chapter III was quantitative, while the narrative explanations as to why some 500 to 600 respondents were fearful about survival, was indeed qualitative. When one mixes the anger of not having adequate and free downtown parking with the tax abatements and other grants provided the large chains -- yet generally denied to rehabilitate downtown businesses -- the reason for the anger comes through loud and clear. The customer base of the rdail respondents, described in Chapter Ill, depends greatly on highways and parking. Naturally the major chains locating outside of "Main Street" have the advantage of parking lots; ease of access; freedom from parking meters and downtown traffic congestion. Added to that, the fear of crime and violence in downtown evening shopping creates major cisadvantages for the small "Main Street" '. retailer. A Inajor question addressed to the small retailer related to strategies they might apply in competing more etfectively with the major discount chains. While the staff received an 84% response'rate, it was lower thau the anawers to other questions. The respondents appear fragmented in their choices as -.veIl. as fmstrated, confused, pessimistic and having trouble concentrating on how to answer this question. Fifty-six percent selected alternative strategies that could be defined as somewhat "positive"; such as to "increase stafr'; "increase visibility"; "provide fuller service" and "expand product lines." Forty- four percent of the choices were "defensive" strategies, going from "raising or lowering prices"; "decreasing staff'; "liquidating or selling the business" or "going into bankmptcy." There was not a great deal of difference among the four states' as to "positive" strategies. Illinois was the most positi ve with 60%; New York with 56%; California 55% and Pennsylvania with 50%. The author is confident that the profile of small retail business as portrayed in Chapter III showed consistency and validity, not only nationally but also as among the four states studied. Surprisingly, respondents have generally been in business longer than might be the popular notion with a large proportion having been in business for more than 10 years. Small retailers, on the whole, showed serious concern about their future viability and evidence of job loss, liquidation and bankmptcy. The State of Mind of the Small Retailer in America: His Fears and Concerns about Survival . As was indicated in Chapters II and III, there was approximately a 10% return of questionnaires mailed to Pennsylvania, California, New York and Illinois. The research staffhad categorized these http://www.shilsreport.org/chap10.html 10/6/99