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6.1. ERMUSR 01-14-2014
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6.1. ERMUSR 01-14-2014
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- 3 - <br /> With limited exceptions amounting to less than 10%of MISO's load,6 MISO LSEs retain <br /> their retail service obligations and the accompanying long-term perspective, planning stability, <br /> assurance of cost recovery for prudently incurred investment, and financial security. That <br /> stability enables MISO-area LSEs to make long-term financial commitments (by ownership or <br /> contract)to long-lived, capital-intensive generating assets.7 It also means that MISO's <br /> deficiency charge for load that fails to timely procure adequate capacity resources is backstopped <br /> by powerful state law remedies. <br /> In eastern regions that have largely discarded that model for one focused on short term <br /> (e.g., year-to-year) competitive retail service subscriptions, the RTOs have struggled with <br /> replacing that"missing commitment."8 In their attempts to replace what MISO still has, the <br /> eastern RTOs have generally mandated that LSEs must procure capacity through their centrally- <br /> operated capacity markets, and are straining to prop up prices in those markets in the hope of <br /> inducing non-LSE generation owners to build capacity for sale through those centralized <br /> markets. But their rules put at risk new ratepayer-funded long-term investments, by subjecting <br /> LSEs to purchasing capacity a second time if their own capacity(offered at a MOPR-elevated <br /> price)does not clear the market. The centralized mandatory capacity market "solutions"to that <br /> FirstEnergy to keep the plants on line. See, e.g., Scott Disavino,PJM says FirstEnergy can shut two Pennsylvania <br /> coal plants(Sept.20,2013),available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/utilities-firstenergy-pim- <br /> idUSL2N0HG20420130920;Platts,PJM asks FirstEnergy to delay retirement of coal-fired power plants(Aug. 14, <br /> 2013),available at http://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/birmingham-alabama/pjm-asks-firstenergy-to- <br /> delay-retirement-o f-coal-21421569. <br /> 6 The only portions of the MISO region in which ultimate consumers may freely switch to a competitive retail <br /> supplier independent of their distribution service provider consist of the MISO portion of Illinois(which is much <br /> smaller in load terms than the PJM portion of Illinois)and 10%of Michigan load. Together,those two retail choice <br /> areas amount to some 10,000 MW of peak load—approximately 10%of MISO's load prior to the ISO's recent <br /> southward expansion,and now an even smaller portion. <br /> 7 Midwest TDUs made this point in their initial and reply Minimum Offer Price Rule briefs in Docket No. ER1 I- <br /> 4081,filed Oct. 14,2013,and Nov.25,2013(eLibrary Nos. 20131015-5126 and 20131125-5194,respectively). <br /> 8 See Tr.91-92(Robert Ethier, ISO-NE)(recognizing the crucial role played by LSEs capable of long-term capacity <br /> commitments). <br /> 118 <br />
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