Laserfiche WebLink
whether the landowner created the need for the variance; and (6) whether, <br />in light of all of the above factors, allowing the variance will serve the <br />interests of justice. <br />754 N.W.2d at 331 (footnote omitted). Rowell's interpretation of the "undue hardship" <br />standard, requiring only that the proposed use be "reasonable," would render the "undue <br />hardship" standard in section 462.357 less stringent than the "practical difficulties" <br />standard and much less stringent than the "particular hardship" standard in the county <br />variance statute, which the "undue hardship" standard appears to parallel. See Stadsvold, <br />754 N.W.2d at 331. In short, our analysis in Stadsvold simply does not leave room for <br />the Rowell "reasonable manner" standard.12 <br />'a The City argues that, even if Rowell was based on an erroneous reading of the text <br />of section 462.357, subdivision 6, the standard in Rowell has been used by municipalities <br />for many years in determining whether to grant a variance. See, e.g., Mohler v. City of St. <br />Louis Park, 643 N.W.2d 623, 631 (Minn. App. 2002); Nolan v. City of Eden Prairie, 610 <br />N.W.2d 697, 701 (Minn. App. 2000); Sagstetter v. City of St. Paul, 529 N.W.2d 488, 492 <br />(Minn. App. 1995). The City suggests that, because the legislature has amended section <br />462.3 57 many times since Rowell and has not disturbed the court of appeals' <br />interpretation of the "undue hardship" standard, we should treat the legislature as having <br />ratified the Rowell standard. But the legislature has provided that "[w]hen a court of last <br />resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same <br />subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language." Minn. <br />Stat. § 645.17(4) (2008). The court of appeals is not "a court of last resort." See <br />Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women's Ctr., Inc., 673 N.W.2d 270, 276 <br />(Minn. 2002) (stating that the court of appeals is not the court of last resort with respect <br />to statutory construction). Nor does the denial of a petition for review give a court of <br />appeals decision more precedential value than a court of appeals decision from which no <br />review was sought. Murphy v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 388 N.W.2d 732, 739 (Minn. <br />1986). We therefore reject the City's argument that the legislature has ratified the Rowell <br />standard. <br />17 <br />